Tuesday 27 September 2011

A critique of New Labour: 1997-2010


The 1997 UK General Election secured a sensational landslide majority for the Labour Party after 18 years of Conservative rule. With a 179 seat majority over all other parties, virtually anything seemed possible. Labour, or indeed New Labour, radically redefined themselves in order to be electable after the long Thatcherite years, and this paid off. However, was this at the expense of principles; of implementing a genuine Centre-Left programme?

There is little doubt that Labour’s leftward drift under the influence of Michael Foot and Tony Benn in the early 80s significantly alienated them from the public. Their 1983 manifesto, a commitment to unilateral disarmament, nationalisation of all privatised utilities and the abolition of the House of Lords, was dubbed “the longest suicide note in history” by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman. Taking aside the hugely popular Falklands campaign, Margaret Thatcher had taken many unpopular decisions in Government, yet in the face of an out of touch Opposition, she secured a landslide. It would take another three Leaders (Neil Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair) to complete the move to the Centre ground and be electable again. Redesigned as ‘New Labour’, the party under Tony Blair ended the long standing ‘tax and spend’ stigma of the party (much as Bill Clinton did with the ‘New’ Democratic Party in the US), and symbolically abolished ‘Clause IV’; the commitment to wholesale nationalisation, or “the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange”. No doubt these were divisive issues within the Labour ranks, but Blair could point to a first Labour landslide since 1945 and a return to Government since 1979 as justification. The issue is what happened next, or indeed what didn’t happen next.

A possibility to “mend the schism that occurred in progressive forces in British politics at the start of this (20th century) century” (quote from Blair, by Ashdown) was elaborated on by both Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown in their respective autobiographies. Despite Labour’s historic majority, a coalition with the Liberal Democrats and a Government majority of 269 over all other parties was seriously considered by both men. Ashdown stated he “had always believed that the best relationship between parties in partnership was to be in Government together”, with Blair expressing that “from the off, I wanted to have them (the Lib Dems) in the big tent”. From an ideological perspective, this could have worked. Blair says in his autobiography that he had gone out of his way to “pay tribute in my own political heritage to Lloyd George, Keynes and Beveridge”, a strong acknowledgment of prominent and historic Liberals. With Blair and Ashdown both describing the inevitable protests from the likes of John Prescott and Gordon Brown over such a deal, Blair muses that the Lib Dems “lacked the necessary fibre to govern”, preferring to be “honest critics”, whilst Ashdown concludes Blair did not seize the opportunity of the “golden hours”, and overestimated “his own powers”. In this sense, a consideration of what might have been and what didn’t happen can only be hypothetical; despite a willingness from both men to contemplate a coalition, we will not know for certain how close this came to reality.

In terms of policy, New Labour certainly adhered to Tory elements (a plan which brought New Labour traditionally Tory heartlands). They restricted spending levels for their first two years of power, and maintained the top level of income tax at 40%; increased to 50% only after the global financial crisis and after Tony Blair had left office. Also, perhaps reminiscent of Michael Howard’s “prison works” mantra, New Labour adopted the line “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” as policy. Despite these centrist, or even centre-right leanings, there were historic successes. Peace in Northern Ireland was achieved after centuries of struggle, along with the downfall of Milosevic in Kosovo and the implementation of the minimum wage (now supported by the Conservative Party after initial opposition). It is in this sense, however, that Blair appears far more at home in international than domestic affairs; Paddy Ashdown states Blair’s “hesitation on domestic affairs” interestingly “did not apply to international affairs”. However, despite Social Democracy entailing a mixture of public and private enterprise, Blair (who has repeatedly stated that he is a Social Democrat) did not oversee any major incorporation of public services in to his plans, and did little to reverse privatisation measures from the previous Government; Blair himself admits that despite disagreeing with John Major’s privatisation of Britain’s railways, he did not “want to waste money re-nationalising it”. Some policies appeared to form, as Gerwirtz states,  a seemingly confusing amalgamation of  “neo-liberal authoritarian humanism”, linking both a “neo-conservative strand of New Right thinking” and “a social democratic stance” (Gewirtz 2002, p.156). Furthermore, Blair stressed his intention not to “alienate business” in his autobiography, and won the support of the powerful media mogul Rupert Murdoch, the former Conservative supporter unlikely to be a champion of Social Democracy, and a sign of de-regulation drives to come.

Current Conservative MP Louise Bagshawe has said she briefly changed her allegiances to New Labour in 1997, believing Blair to be “socially liberal, but an economic tory”. The likes of Shaun Woodward MP (Conservative) were also converted, with the New Labour project’s domination of the Centre ground apparent. With this hegemony, the Liberal Democrats arguably became the most radical party of the three major parties, with their platform including raising the income tax threshold and providing a multi-billion pound pupil premium for disadvantaged pupils, as well as their trademark commitment to electoral reform. This goes some way to suggesting that the “schism” of the Centre-Left was not healed, with Nick Clegg in recent times claiming that the Lib Dems are the “true progressives” and the “vanguard of the progressive Centre-Left”. Furthermore, in Blair’s autobiography he frequently states his desire not to alienate the “middle England” vote which he so successfully garnered from 1997 onwards; as previously stated income tax was never raised in his tenure, and even indirect taxes such as National Insurance were raised minimally. Blair’s courting of Right wing media such as Rupert Murdoch’s empire gives the impression of the types of people he was willing to surround himself with; hardly Centre-Left progressives.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are still heavily divisive issues to this day, and indeed are still ongoing. For New Labour and Blair in particular, it will always be a permanent and negative association. This, and arguably the lack of a Centre-Left platform, led many in the youth and student population to ditch New Labour for the Liberal Democrats (on an anti-Iraq war platform), arguably furthering the view that they became the most radical Party. New Labour’s introduction of top-up tuition fees (despite a promise not to do so) hastened this move. In an ironic reversal, the Liberal Democrats’ vote to increase tuition fees in 2010 (despite the promise not to do so and the policy of abolition), not to mention their Coalition with the Conservatives, has led the student population back to Labour, albeit with a new leader. Furthermore, the de-regulation drives during New Labour’s term of the markets and the banking industry were arguably key factors in exacerbating the financial crisis of 2007 onwards, although it was a global issue. In the present context, support appears to be returning to Labour. However, it is perhaps telling that in the 2010 Labour leadership contest, all five candidates rejected Tony Blair’s critique that Labour lost the 2010 Election because “they stopped being New Labour”, and all of the candidates appeared to strongly attempt to ‘move on’ from Blair and Brown.

In the same leadership contest, Diane Abbott claimed that 5 million people had stopped voting for Labour over the years from 1997; 1 million voted for other parties, whilst 4 million no longer vote at all. It is difficult to fully examine or make deductions from this demographic, but the aspect of apathy is certainly a strong component here; perhaps New Labour did not go far enough for many of the 4 million apathetic voters? New Labour stalwarts may well point to their long hegemony of Government in response to this; successive Conservative leaders faltered, and it was only after David Cameron’s succession of Michael Howard in 2005, and his shifting of the Tories closer to the Centre, that the Opposition looked like forming a Government. The Economy enjoyed a long boom period, leading Gordon Brown to proudly proclaim an “end to boom and bust”. Nevertheless, you are unlikely to find many glowing references of New Labour’s time in Government today, and the failure to reconnect with those 5 million lost votes was to cost them dear in 2010, and perhaps in the future too.

I believe that with the huge majorities obtained under Blair, New Labour had the potential to implement far reaching and meaningful reforms. However, it is arguable that he, as Ashdown states, failed to “seize the initiative” on the domestic agenda. Blair wanted to permanently alter the British landscape, as Margaret Thatcher had done, but perhaps for this very reason he was cautious in his approach for radical change. It seemed that the focus was often on the next Election and to not alienate the coalition of ‘middle England’ and wealthy donors in this approach. What do I mean by radical change, and the opportunity for more to be done? It entails many things. For a Social Democrat, a reversal of Thatcher’s neoliberal economic policies must surely have been a priority, yet Blair did little to change this; he himself admits he likes a “liberal economic” approach, and a trust in the markets. Furthermore, despite numerous top down targets, social mobility actually worsened in the period between 1997 and 2010. The target of eliminating child poverty appears ever more unlikely to be met, and on the education platform Blair says in his autobiography that equity in education should never be at the expense of academic excellence. On the constitutional platform, New Labour had a brilliant opportunity for electoral reform, with the Jenkins Commission recommending the use of the ‘AV+’ method to elect the House of Commons, yet Blair was not able to assert his authority over dissenters in his cabinet such as John Prescott and Gordon Brown. The issue of electing the House of Lords, currently an agenda for the incumbent Coalition Government, was another initiative not seized (although the 1999 House of Lords Act removed hereditary peers).

Labour’s move to the Centre also elicited both the loss and gain of voters. The capture of ‘middle England’ and former Tory voters reaped dividends in 1997, yet it is a strong proportion of the working class who will have felt hard done by, perhaps exclaiming as Ed Balls states that Labour “aren’t on our side”. The current Party policy of Labour to abolish tuition fees perhaps indicates that their introduction in the first place was a mistake, and Ed Miliband triumphed in his election as Leader on a platform to the Left of many of the candidates (including brother David) which emphasised the need to banish New Labour to the history books; gaining support from numerous prominent Trade Unions indicates how strong an influence they still possess in the Labour Party.

It is fair to say that Tony Blair, the figurehead of New Labour, is to this day intensely divisive in political discussions. When failures are listed, they often include a lack of economic and banking regulation, along with a controversial foreign policy and a negative impact on social mobility-all issues which a Centre-Left ideology (on the surface at least) would have eradicated. In this sense, New Labour could be deemed a failure in itself. However, their success in ending 18 years of Conservative rule, followed by a record 13 years in Government themselves, cannot be ignored. The sad truth could well be that, contrary to opinion that the UK is largely progressive (but politically divided), it is conservative with a small ‘c’, and only a battle for the Centre ground and the rejection of Keynesian principles can bring Electoral success, something which New Labour did very well with. Was New Labour progressive? In some cases, yes; the minimum wage, the windfall tax, the ‘Freedom of Information Act’. Were they Centre-Left? My opinion is that they rarely were, but their time in Government often transcended the left-right axis, and their success in hegemony may well discard my theory; this does not stop the theory from provoking interesting, controversial and inconclusive discussion.


-Ben

References
Ashdown, P “A Fortunate Life”, 2009, Aurum Press
Blair, T “A Journey”, 2010, Hutchinson
Gerwirtz, S (2002) The Managerial School; Post-welfarism and Social Justice in Education, Routledge, USA/Canada

Barack Obama 2012 President-Elect: Yes we can?


Few doubt the historic significance of Barack Obama’s 2008 Election victory; the first African-American to be President, and with powerful rhetoric suggesting that anything thereafter was possible. However, many doubt his current record, and whether he can deliver. A fragile economy and a battering in the 2010 mid-term Elections suggests a turbulent time ahead, but may a divided alternative aid his cause?

Obama’s powerful “yes we can” message has diminished to “yes we can, but...” in many quarters, with low approval ratings and high unemployment to boot. The mid-terms brought a “shellacking” to the Democrats and Obama, with control of the House lost and the Senate held on to by the slimmest of margins. The radical right ‘Tea Party’ movement captured the imagination of millions of disgruntled Americans, with the “mamma grizzlies” of Sarah Palin and Christine O’Donnell trouncing numerous Democrats. An indication of what is to follow? Despite these bleak statements, numerous commentators believe that the Tea Party movement, a powerful vehicle in shifting the Republican Party further to the Right, actually cost the GOP further seats and control of the Senate, with many moderate Americans alienated and preferring to vote Democrat in marginal seats. Consolation or not, the image of the 2006 Democrat sweep of the House and Senate appears distant, with the 2010 mid-terms more reminiscent of Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Republican Revolution” against incumbent Democrat Bill Clinton. Obama’s plan for tax cuts for poor and middle income Americans and tax rises for the top earners has already been compromised, with the new Republican Congress threatening tax rises for all Americans if tax cuts for all Americans (including the highest earners) would not be implemented; this across the board tax cut is estimated to cost the Government $6 trillion. Lockdown between Democrats and Republicans has already occurred, with strong divisions over how to tackle the yawning budget deficit and whether to increase the maximum level of debt. Obama’s problems are long term as well as short term.

Obama’s message of preferring to be “a really good one term President than an average two term President” strongly hints at defeatism already. Despite Obama’s record of compromise and bipartisanship, he still has to contend with the liberal Democrat wing of his Party who exclaim that he is not going far enough in his supposedly liberal agenda, an issue shared by the likes of FDR (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) in the past. Yet he has already thrown his hat in to the ring for re-election, and has set a target of raising $1 billion for his 2012 campaign. He invested much political capital in to achieving universal healthcare, a potent issue in the mid-terms, yet the achievement of universal healthcare in the first place (a long term goal by Democrats for generations) is surely to be applauded. His multi-billion dollar economic stimulus package was a bold attempt early in to his Presidency to create jobs and growth. He achieved meaningful bank regulation with the ‘Volcker Rule’, reminiscent of the New Deal’s ‘Glass-Steagall Act’ in restricting the merge of commercial and investment banking. Symbolically, he eliminated the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of gays in the military, allowing for people in the army to be openly gay without discrimination; this was achieved days before the new Republican Congress took control. He has had his failings; his deadline of closing Guantanamo Bay has passed without its closure, and action on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are works in progress. These problems may yet be eradicated, providing he is re-elected.

So does he stand a chance of re-election? I believe he does. Low approval ratings are of concern, but his ratings are similar or higher at this stage of the Presidency than those of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton; both succeeded in re-election, and in times of tough economic conditions. He is under attack from a resurgent Republican Party, but they are an increasingly divided Party. Despite its mixture of moderates and radicals, its shift to the Right does not appear to be altering, with the Tea Party movement continuing its alienation of various members of society. The Republican nominee contenders of Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin do not share Obama’s oratory power and skills. The nomination of the much maligned Palin could actually aid Obama’s cause. Farcical claims that Obama is a socialist and/or terrorist (and not American) can only serve to play in to Obama’s plans; much like Clinton did against Bob Dole in 1996, he can be the man of moderation in the face of harshly radical rhetoric. Obama’s well drilled and organised activists were crucial to his 2008 success; they will need to be again. These factors all stand him in good stead for 2012.

However, the make or break factor of both his Presidency and re-election remains; the economy. “It’s the economy, stupid” said Bill Clinton’s 1994 campaign manager; a return of the tax and spend stigma of the past will only damage the Democrats. A multi-trillion dollar national debt and deficit will not go away anytime soon, and growth appears slow. The 70 million Americans who voted for Obama in 2008 will not vote for him again if they feel their jobs are under threat, or if indeed there are no jobs at all. Opposition parties across the world often prosper when an incumbent Party is struggling to correct a fragile and economy; the Republicans will return to the White House if the Democrats do not solve this, and they will dismantle such matters as his healthcare reforms along the way. But Democratic members and followers need not wholly despair at such bleak statements. On an admittedly broad platform, a fragile economy did not stop FDR in 1936 and Bill Clinton in 1996 to get re-elected, nor did a turbulent period in 1964 prevent LBJ’s (Lyndon B Johnson) landslide victory. The crucial element, however, is that in the cases of FDR and Clinton, they significantly boosted the economy in their first terms, though not necessarily at the beginning. In LBJ’s case, he arguably rode the sentimental tide of JFK’s (John F Kennedy) death. Obama needs an FDR or Clinton moment; something meaningful and effective in boosting economic recovery, be it a substantial public works programme or a bold tax stand-off against the Republicans.

Re-election is certainly possible. But so much of it hinges on the economy. Recapturing the imagination of millions of Americans is one thing; correcting the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression is quite another.


-Ben

What next for the Lib Dems?


The 2010 UK General Election proved to be a landmark year in politics. Despite widespread apathy with New Labour, the public did not vote overwhelmingly for any candidate; the result was a first hung parliament for thirty six years, and a “complete and comprehensive” coalition between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. To describe the period since then as ‘turbulent’ only scratches the surface, but the question remains; what next for the Lib Dems?

Coalition inevitably brings compromise, and as a 57 seat third party, the Liberal Democrats were no different. Key manifesto pledges were delivered; raising the income tax threshold to £10,000, a multi-billion pound pupil premium for disadvantaged primary school children and a referendum on changing the voting system for General Elections. However, the popular student pledge of abolishing University tuition fees was not enacted, and the referendum was on the Alternative Vote (AV) system, not Proportional Representation (PR); long cherished by Liberal Democrats. With senior Liberal Democrats voting for an increase in tuition fees as advised by the ‘Browne Review’ (despite a pre-Election promise not to do so), the vast bulk of the student electorate (estimated at 1.5 million people) was immediately alienated and lost. Furthermore, a crushing defeat in the AV referendum has arguably set back voting reform by as much as two decades. The loss of a near century old goal of changing the voting system led many Liberal Democrats to consider what their purpose in the Coalition is now.

The task looks unenviable and gargantuan. With poll ratings in single digits, and bearing the brunt of public anger over deep spending cuts (the Liberal Democrats were arguably the only losers in the 2011 local elections), the Liberal Democrats’ future looks bleak. On statistics alone, they conversely appear to be a success; 75% of the 2010 Liberal Democrat manifesto has been enacted in to the Coalition against 60% of the 2010 Conservative manifesto. This, however, appears not to have struck a chord with the public. So the next step? After a bruising local election result, Nick Clegg has called for “muscular Liberalism”, and the championing of Lib Dem ‘victories’ within the Coalition. The amendments to Andrew Lansley’s NHS reforms, including placing the emphasis on patient care as opposed to private competition, could be a step in this direction. However, it is unlikely that the public would take this as an opportunity for unconditional and unilateral forgiveness for the Lib Dems; they may ask why they did not prevent the reforms earlier. On Constitutional matters, electing the House of Lords (promised by all three major parties in their manifestos) may be a consolation prize, yet even this appears to have stumbling blocks; the appetite for reform does not appear strong amongst Conservative Party members, whilst the Labour Party question an 80% elected House of Lords as opposed to a fully elected second chamber. Nick Clegg’s speech on the subject, urging not to “make the best the enemy of the good”, was met with derision from Conservatives and Labourites together. In addition, would the general public find enthusiasm for such reforms?

Another idea mooted has been replacing Clegg as Leader. It has been Clegg, not David Cameron, who students have burnt in effigy on huge protest marches. ‘Cleggmania’, a distant memory from the televised General Election debates, has turned to ‘Cleggzilla’, a hate figure in his very own Sheffield Hallam constituency. The removal of a Coalition instigator may bring a short term reprieve to the Lib Dems. Nick Clegg has been viewed as so “toxic” that Ed Miliband refused to share a platform with him during the AV campaign, with ‘Yes to AV’ campaigners urging him to “lie low”. Nevertheless, with the Coalition viewed so negatively in most quarters, would simply changing the Leader change the public’s perception? Unless the Coalition was immediately dismantled, any incoming Leader would be tarred with the same brush as Clegg, whilst leaving the Coalition could emphasise that entering it was a historic mistake, therefore further diminishing respect for the Lib Dems. The apparent Leader in waiting, Party President Tim Farron, has made no secret of his distaste of the Conservative Party (no doubt a popular mantra with activists), and his unambiguous commitment to the Centre-Left could play well with wavering voters. In this sense, maintaining an unpopular Coalition with the Conservatives would severely reduce his standing as a ‘change’ candidate. The other potential candidate, Chris Huhne, has contributed to the Orange Book, like Clegg. Also like Clegg, he is a Cabinet member; these factors raise the question of whether he would be much different from Clegg (the difference between them in the 2007 Lib Dem Leadership was less than 500 votes). Therefore, the replacement of an unpopular figurehead nevertheless raises new issues and problems.

Leave the Coalition? Apart from instability in the Economy that this would exacerbate, a snap Election would leave the Lib Dems with single digit MPs if current poll trends are to be believed. After decades of waiting for a role in Government, jettisoning after a single year may beg the question: are the Liberal Democrats ever viable for Government? Attracting voters would be a considerable task. The student and progressive/Centre-Left vote has flocked to Labour in considerable numbers; the near 7 million people who voted Lib Dem in 2010 are unlikely to do so again in the near future. Reaffirming their commitment to abolishing tuition fees will sound hollow after recent events in Government, and possibly a little desperate. Confusion over their place on the political spectrum further emphasises the difficulty of attracting or maintaining support. The “neither left nor right” mantra of Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy switched to a “Centre-Left” commitment from Ming Campbell, with Nick Clegg now saying that they are “of the Centre, for the Centre”. But what rings true with the electorate? Do they move left and attempt to win back student support amidst apathy? Or do they shift rightwards and attempt to claim moderate Tory votes, and appease the ‘Orange Book’ wing of the Party?

I believe one of the few solutions to a significantly difficult period in the Liberal Democrats’ history is to plan long term. It would make little sense to displace Clegg now; the Coalition has to be seen as a success, or at least the right decision, in order to trumpet Three-Party politics and Coalitions in the future. “Muscular Liberalism” is indeed needed; the public need to know what the Lib Dems have done to alter and water down the Conservative Party, and how the Lib Dems’ Coalition gains will be of benefit (such as raising the income tax threshold). More hypothetically perhaps, the Economy needs to improve over the course of the five year parliament; growth and jobs are needed amidst an “age of austerity”. Unquestionably though, they need to rediscover their Centre-Left mantra and radical policies which made them so popular in the past. Tim Farron could be the man for this, but only after Nick Clegg leads the Lib Dems to one more General Election; if they are to be crushed, it is better to have one Leader bear the brunt of this than another who has taken over during the Coalition. A partnership with Labour in the future cannot be ruled out by Party bosses; an anti-Conservative alliance once realised by Paddy Ashdown and Tony Blair may prove to be popular. My Grandma recently said “I remember the days of Jeremy Thorpe when the Liberals only had 9 seats!” It is the vital task of the 21st Century Liberal Democrats to avoid that happening again. 


-Ben