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We have another fascinating and in-depth guest post from Charles Britten
That was the situation in 1923, an extraordinary election when the Conservatives won 258 seats, Labour 191 and the Liberals 158, the high-point of three-party politics in Britain. Suffice to say, the only aspect of that result that might repeat itself this time is the Labour seats total - and that may be their best-case scenario.
The by-election that never was
At this point, I must follow customary procedure and thank Ben for letting me run loose with another guest blog. As ever, the disclaimer is that the views expressed are not necessarily from the centre-left, and in this case will form an overview of what may indeed be an historic election, a time when Britain's history as a nation is undoubtedly taking a different turn, whatever one's individual view of whether this is for good or ill.
The blog I originally planned was to be about the Manchester Gorton by-election, the first time this writer had been a constituent in such an event. Theresa May, however, had other ideas.
There are, of course, obvious reasons for the snap election, about 20 of them in fact, each a percentage point of lead in the opinion polls. True, there is a case for giving the prime minister a personal mandate: A large majority might indeed provide more strength and leeway in the Brexit negotiations. That will not really be because of the opposition from the other parties she cited; after all, opposing things is their job. Rather, it will help buttress her against the otherwise vulnerable situation of being undermined by backbench eurosceptics opposed to the inevitable compromises that any negotiation will bring. Some believe a bigger majority will lead to a harder Brexit. This is possible, but then again, the likes of Bill Cash will have less chance to twist her arm.
For all that, let's cut to the chase; this election would not have been called without that massive poll lead. They didn't have opinion polls in 1923, but suffice to say, had they done so Stanley Baldwin might have thought twice about going to the country. This time, a landslide of historic proportions awaits.
Poll dancing
Of course, the statement above is controversial; what, you might ask, about the polls? After all, they got things wrong last time, when it seemed a hung parliament was all but certain.
It bears repeating, however, that when the polls are wrong, it is only in one direction: they overestimate Labour support and underestimate that of the Tories. It is a point that seems lost on Corbyn supporters trying to discredit their dire figures. Quite simply, the polls would have to be far more wrong at this stage than they ever have been for the result to be remotely favourable to Labour.
What a Conservative landslide would look like
The largest Tory majority since the second world war was 146, which Mrs Thatcher secured in 1983 with 397 seats. That was the largest tally the party had managed since 1931, a year when everyone ganged up on Labour, including Ramsay MacDonald, the man who had led both the party's governments up to that time. That last time the Conservatives won more than 400 seats in a 'normal' election was in 1924, which may have far more in common with this election than 1923.
To talk about a landslide, however, is to suggest the Conservatives will win abundantly in areas where they have not done for many years.
In terms of electoral geography, three major impediments to Conservative victory were present even up to 2010; There was an over-reliance on winning in the suburbs and the shires when many of these areas returned Liberal Democrat MPs on a much larger scale than the old Liberals and Liberal-SDP Alliance ever did. The party had also lost ground in the large cities outside London, and in Scotland. Last time, the first of these three concerns evaporated due to the Liberal Democrat collapse, particularly in the south-west. But the others remain.
The historic Tory decline in Scotland has, of course, been well documented. However, the few polls produced so far have suggested the party is starting to make a serious comeback. While the SNP remain ahead, the unionist vote appears to be shifting to the Conservatives. While others talk about 'progressive alliances' to defeat a hard Brexit in England, up in Scotland the national question is paramount, and the tactical voting is likely to be against the SNP. This could also benefit the Liberal Democrats in several seats, such as Dunbartonshire East and Edinburgh West. Talk of a dozen Conservative seats has been greeted with caution, but it is far from risible.
City slickers
If having just one seat in Scotland has been headline news, the severe Tory weakness in big cities outside London in recent elections has somewhat slipped under the radar. The party only holds a handful of seats in other big cities - I define these as where the population exceeds 400,000 - and almost all of them are in satellite towns moved into these cities by boundary expansions in the 1974 reorganisation of local government. It is no coincidence that these constituencies do not even bear the names of these cities, as they maintain distinct identities. This includes appendages like Sutton Coldfield in Birmingham, Pudsey in Leeds and Shipley in Bradford. If these seats are discounted, the regional big city tally of Tory seats stands at just one: Bristol North West. Not a single seat with the prefix Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow, Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool, Edinburgh or Bradford is Conservative-held. Looking back half a century, even in the Labour landslide of 1966 there were Tory seats in all these cities.
The biggest change came in the 1990s. Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds all had Conservative seats as late as 1992, when three of the five Edinburgh constituencies were also held by the party. In 1997 these were all lost, and new Labour's capture of the middle-class vote in big cities has been an enduring feature of the electoral landscape.
Nowhere has epitomised this shift more than Birmingham Edgbaston, a middle-class suburban seat and once a Tory bastion. Labour won it for the first time in 1997 and Gisela Stewart has held it for them ever since. Now she is stepping down, this is a marginal the Conservatives are almost certain to win, along with neighbouring Northfield. Moreover, if Birmingham displays the same sort of swings as the country at large, even Erdington may be captured as well. A swing of that magnitude may also win Leeds North East (another historically Tory seat) and Bradford South.
Similarly, more Bristol seats, particularly Bristol East and possibly Bristol West in a four-way marginal, are serious prospects, while the startling polls in Scotland could see the Tories back in Edinburgh. Indeed, it may be one of the most noteworthy results of the whole election if they come from a distant third to win Edinburgh South, taking a top SNP target seat and wiping Labour off the Scottish electoral map at the same time.
In smaller cities, the pattern is more favourable to the Conservatives. They already hold seats in places like Norwich, York, Cardiff, Derby, Portsmouth, Southampton, Plymouth and Brighton, to which they can add this time round. In particular, look out for possible gains in Coventry, Stoke-on-Trent and Aberdeen. A consequence of such successes would be that the Conservatives could argue more convincingly that they are not just a party of the English shires.
However, two notes of caution; while replicating the swing in Copeland nationally would be enough to produce a thumping Tory majority, the Stoke central by-election the same night saw Labour's vote hold up far better, with only slight improvements in the Tory and UKIP votes. If this applies in both medium and large cities, the Conservative urban gains will be far fewer in number than the national polls suggest. Much will depend on whether the Stoke by-election reflected the presence of UKIP leader Mark Nuttall as its' candidate, for the city is one of those places where UKIP polled well last time, and if a large proportion of these votes can be swung to the Tories, Labour's goose will be cooked.
A second factor may be the fact that the strongest appeal of Corbyn's Labour is among the young, middle class urban base, the types who voted remain - paradoxically, given the pro-leave history of Labour's left - rather than the traditional Labour voters who make up the bulk of its support in places like Stoke. This means in those big city areas where they captured middle-class votes in the 1990s, the Labour vote may hold up significantly better than elsewhere. Expect this effect to be most evident in London.
A dragon turns blue?
If the above analysis appears to omit Wales, it is because this warrants its own study. Thanks to the SNP surge in 2015 the shifting Welsh scene was ignored. The Tories were expected to lose seats. Instead, they were up to 11, their best tally since 1983 and a haul that included the unprecedented capture of Gower. Barely less notable was the increased majority in Cardiff North, where Labour were expected to easily overturn a majority of 194.
Now, however, things could get even better for the Conservatives and worse for Labour. Not since the 1850s have the Tories won a majority of Welsh seats. Labour has been the largest party there in every election since 1922, with a majority every year since 1931. An historic shift beckons.
If winning Gower was a highlight of 2015 for Welsh Tories, Wrexham could be the equivalent this time round. Losing Bridgend, now a marginal, would be another hammer blow for Labour in their south Wales heartland, although not unprecedented as they did lose there in 1983.
This shift is not simply a Welsh Conservative renaissance; the impact of UKIP in traditional Labour-voting areas has been profound. For so long the south Wales valleys have been rock solid for Labour; even in the catastrophe of 1931 they still won all the mining seats there, in stark contrast to sweeping losses in other coalfields such as Durham and Lanarkshire. But this link is being loosened and if Labour loses Wales, the journey back will seem longer than ever.
Progressive alliances and tactical voting
Faced with the prospect of a Tory landslide, one response has been for many supporters and members of 'progressive' parties to advocate anti-Conservative pacts and alliances. In a handful of seats, there have indeed been some local agreements. But there always was little chance of a serious national arrangement. After all, Labour is so divided internally that reaching an external deal would be implausible.
There are also practical barriers. In an interview with the BBC, the Green Party's sole MP Caroline Lucas bemoaned the rejection of the idea by Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron, yet she did so while very obviously speaking from Bristol West, with the Clifton Suspension Bridge conspicuously in view. This highlighted the problem; Bristol West is the only realistic target seat for the Greens, yet it is a Labour-held constituency won last time from the Liberal Democrats, who will be keen to regain the seat in a pro-remain area. So who could possibly be persuaded to stand down there?
Tactical voting is advocated by some as an alternative. But it would be highly unlikely, even in a repeat of the exceptional levels of such voting seen in 1997, that this factor will thwart Theresa May. Indeed, the polling data so far indicates many UKIP voters from 2015 are now backing the Conservatives, which could significantly increase their victory margin. In this election, tactical voting will be anything but a one-way street.
The Liberal Democrats may also be the beneficiaries of some tactical voting, not least - as mentioned above - in Scotland as they are better placed than Labour to make gains for unionism against the SNP, mainly because those who would otherwise vote Tory would be more comfortable switching their vote to them than Mr Corbyn's party.
The Remainer vote fallacy?
This election has placed Brexit front and centre. That being the case, battle lines will be drawn on a Leave versus Remain axis, even if, as we have seen, party allegiances cut right across these. This will be even more true with the second referendum pledges on Brexit made by the Liberal Democrats and Greens.
One of the reasons Mrs May is riding high in the polls appears to be the willing embrace of the Brexit verdict delivered last June, drawing away support from UKIP. The impact of this could be highly significant. In a joint article by psephologist Martin Baxter of Electoral Calculus and Guardian columnist Martin Robbins, it was argued that the 'remainer effect' highlighted by the Richmond Park by-election would not be the boon for the Liberal Democrats some expected. Their analysis suggested that the number of Conservative remainers switching to the Liberal Democrats would be small, while many more Brexiteers were switching from UKIP. The conclusion was that in seats in strongly pro-remain parts of south London, hopes of regaining seats from the Tories were slim.
However, that may be unduly pessimistic. The fact that the south-west of London was so overwhelmingly pro-remain might just provide enough momentum for the Liberal Democrats to win back seats there, especially with big beasts like Ed Davey and Vince Cable seeking comebacks. What is less likely is that that the Liberal Democrats can win back many seats in south-west England, which was mostly pro-Brexit. However, Theresa May's campaigning appearances in seats the Tories are defending in the region shows this is not something she, at least, is taking for granted.
Overall, a pro-remain position is not likely to win a lot of seats for the Liberal Democrats. But with a few gains from Labour likely - watch for Cambridge and a comeback by Simon Hughes in Bermondsey and Old Southwark - and possible gains from the SNP, Tim Farron should at least command a parliamentary party back in double figures, and possibly as many as 20 MPs.
The local angle
The election is an extraordinary one in several ways, not least the fact that in the middle of the campaign we have other votes, with this week's mayoral elections in major conurbations and local elections in many places. It is common for local elections to coincide with general elections, but not for them to happen during the campaign. Thus we have an almost unprecedented factor to consider. One can, therefore, only guess how it might affect the general election campaigning.
Labour's best case would be to elect a bunch of city mayors and do quite well in council elections. This may boost morale if nothing else. However, local elections are often poor indicators of the national political weather, even when held on the same day as a general election; in 2010, for example, Labour lost 97 seats nationally but made significant overall gains at council level.
A more frightening prospect for Labour is a string of bad results. That could send the party into a tailspin. Scotland certainly promises bad news, particularly the likely loss of Glasgow to the SNP.
Are Labour finished - and if so, who will replace them?
I mentioned above that this election may end up looking far more like 1924 than 1923. On that occasion, the Conservatives won 412 seats, Labour 151 and the Liberals 40. Swap the SNP for the Liberals and that may be very close to the figure this time round.
A Labour total of 151 would also be comparable with 1935 (154) and 1922 (142). While these numbers look awful, it is worth noting that the following elections after each of these three results all led to Labour governments, which should serve as a reminder not to write them off.
Of course, this must be contextualised. 1922 represented a party on the rise, finishing ahead of the Liberals for the first time. 1924 may have brought a big defeat, but the net loss of 118 Liberal seats meant the project to replace the party of Asquith and Lloyd George as the main alternative to the Conservatives was all but achieved. Coming after the horrors of 1931, 1935 saw a net gain of 102 seats. There are no similar mitigating factors this time.
However, many will sense that we have been here before: Labour lurched to the far left in the early 1980s and Austin Mitchell MP wrote a book called "Four Years in the Death of the Labour Party". Such forecasts of doom proved wildly wrong. The big problem this time is that Labour in the 1980s still retained strong support in heartland areas of Scotland and Wales. The first of these has gone, and the second is under threat. Even a solid performance in London may add to accusations that the party is increasingly 'metropolitan' in outlook, widening the apparently unbridgeable gulf between its middle class, big city-dwelling, socially liberal remain-voting bloc and its traditional working class, socially conservative, Brexit-voting support base in post-industrial areas.
All this would suggest the party faces an even deeper existential crisis than in the 1980s, but this time it is not the Liberal-SDP Alliance voicing ambitions to replace the party, but UKIP. That such a suggestion can even be made at all is evidence of how much things have changed; in the inter-war years Labour replaced the Liberals as the party of the left. For decades the Liberals, SDP and Liberal Democrats sought to either regain their old mantle or at least realign the centre-left. Now, for the first time, it is suggested Labour can be replaced from the right. Brexit has, it is postulated, created a new paradigm; no longer are political divides about left and right, with UKIP seeking to attract Labour's traditional supporters with an anti-internationalist platform as hostile to contemporary Conservative notions of the importance of free trade and neoliberal economics as it is to immigration and the EU.
However, this ambition is likely to fail. Had the UK not been in the EU, UKIP would not have been formed. It existed for one reason and the rest was window dressing. Lacking ideology, leadership and unity and its historic mission achieved, it is surely on the way out.
That leaves the Liberal Democrats. This election is being fought on turf favourable to them ideologically, and the huge growth in party membership should not be scoffed at. But a limited recovery is the best that can be hoped for. It is not, at least yet, in any position to challenge Labour for the leadership of the opposition. Nine seats is just too low a base to start from.
It is the absence of a strong alternative that gives Labour its best hope. In 1916. Lloyd George split the Liberal Party and made the division with Asquith's followers official when he waged electoral war on them in the general election of 1918. Having ended its previous electoral pact with the Liberals, devised its modern constitution and fielded hundreds of candidates, Labour was well-placed to fill the void. When, 13 years later, Macdonald did the same to Labour, there was nobody able to capitalise on their disaster, with the Liberals themselves fragmenting into different groups.
In a similar way, it is the lack of a viable alternative that may save Labour from ultimate oblivion. But, particularly if he can re-write the leadership election rules to enable his core supporters to keep the hard left in charge when he departs, Corbyn may cut off the obvious route to recovery taken by Kinnock, Smith, and ultimately Blair. It is such an act of ideological masochism that could pave the way for another party to take its place. The only truly viable alternative to the Conservatives is a party of the centre-left.
