Wednesday, 16 April 2014

Is coalition a dirty word?




2010 saw the first formal coalition in the UK since the Second World War, if you exclude the brief ‘Lib-Lab’ pact of 1977-78. Despite unpopular elements within the current Coalition, certain pundits are predicting a hung parliament in 2015. However, the prospect of another coalition has been met with negativity from senior politicians, with Douglas Alexander calling the idea a “nonsense”, and David Cameron, eager to placate his many right wing MPs, appears to be similarly cool on the prospect. The general public haven’t exactly given the current Coalition a ringing endorsement, so is ‘coalition’ really a dirty word?


Under First Past the Post (FPTP), the concept of coalition has been an alien one in Britain. Coalitions in the 20th century were mainly in times of urgency; the First and Second World Wars had national governments, as did the 1931 administration in the wake of the Great Depression. 1974 saw a Hung Parliament, but a second election later in that year saw Harold Wilson’s Labour Party claim a wafer-thin majority. In contrast, European countries frequently have power-sharing deals, a key exponent being Germany. Angel Merkel is seen as a strong and determined leader (see her comparisons with Mrs Thatcher) but to my knowledge she isn’t labelled a ‘sell-out’ for having coalitions with the SPD (Social Democratic Party). The latest election in Germany has seen a very fair compromise between the two largest parties in Germany; the SPD got a minimum wage and a lower retirement age, whilst Merkel’s Christian Democrats got an agreement not to raise taxes. This coalition was despite the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) making a deal with their prefered partners, the FDP (Free Democratic Party), in the 2009 election. Is coalition really such a bad thing?


The national government during the Second World War can certainly be seen as a success, not only for Allied victory but for the post-war consensus which followed. However, Ramsay MacDonald’s popularity and standing certainly suffered as a result of his 1931 coalition, and the Lib-Lab pact of 1977-78 dissipated relatively quickly. I admit that as a Liberal Democrat it is easier for me than for someone from a historically majoritarian party (Labour/Conservative) to present the virtues of coalition, but who is to say that coalitions in the recent past wouldn’t have been beneficial? Had the 1980s seen a PR voting system or the absence of a Tory-boosting Falklands victory, coalitions could have tempered the worst excesses of Thatcherism. An SDP-Liberal Alliance coalition with the Conservatives could have seen the positive aspects of Mrs Thatcher’s governments retained (trade union reform, reduction in top rate from 80%, ability to buy council houses) whilst reining in or diluting certain negative aspects (poll tax, top rate at 40%, inflation prioritised over unemployment, Euroscepticism, erosion of local democracy). Similarly, a progressive alliance with the Labour Party could have ousted Thatcher whilst removing the militant tendency and the ‘longest suicide note in history’ that is the 1983 Labour manifesto. This, of course, paints a rather rose-tinted view; Mrs Thatcher was anything but a consensus politician, and compromise was a dirty word for the trade unionists of the era (perhaps it still is). However, had the mathematics of seats in Parliament dictated a hung parliament, what leverage would Thatcher and Kinnock have had to disregard outright a coalition?

A nasty problem in politics is that compromise is seen as a weakness; just look at the Republican Party’s intransigence during budget negotiations with the Democrats in the US. This absolutist position may well boost morale and solidarity, but it can have disastrous consequences for the country as a whole; just see the previous example and the ‘fiscal cliff’. I would of course love a Liberal Democrat majority in 2015, but pragmatism, along with the natural constraints of electoral power and performance, mean that it won’t happen. Compromise is, as John Cleese put it in a 1980s political broadcast for the SDP, when two sides who had previously disagreed come to an agreement. David Cameron put it as two parties with differences coming together “in the national interest” in 2010. Let’s look at the merits of the current Coalition, which all too often are ignored amidst tribal cries of ‘betrayal’ and ‘selling out’; a £10,500 income tax threshold, a multi-billion pound pupil premium for the poorest primary school students, the biggest increase in the state pension and free school meals for all infant school pupils to name a few Lib Dem achievements. In addition to this, the Lib Dems have blocked the snooper’s charter, an inheritance tax cut for the rich and the ability to sack workers at will to name a few Tory policies blocked.


Naturally, we wish we could have more policies realised. A Mansion Tax would be a great progressive policy, a PR electoral system would help, and the tuition fee policy has been talked to death. However, it’s better to get some policies through, and to block some Tory policies, rather than none at all. This is where the extreme left and right come unstuck. Too often they will refuse to compromise, to enter agreements or to cooperate; as I’ve mentioned before, this leads them to delusions of grandeur and a sense of ‘job done’. However, the irony is that physical achievements of their cherished convictions are at 0%. Look at the militant tendency of the 1980s; implicitly, many party members in that tendency prefered to see unrestrained Thatcherism than to get a centrist consolidation or a partial realisation of progressive ideals. The Lib Dems could have mirrored this in 2010 and declared “we won’t sell out”, and this may have resulted in a short term poll boost. However, had we done this, what would be the point of voting Lib Dem? Why vote for popular policies over decades, only to back out at the final hurdle when there’s a chance for some of them being finally achieved?


Not only is there intrinsic value in coalitions, but pragmatic ones too. As a sixth former, I remember how unpopular Labour were from 2008-2010. Many polls predicted a comfortable victory for the Conservatives; how could the opposition not prosper in the wake of financial ruin? Nevertheless, Cameron couldn’t win a majority; surely it is foolish for Cameron to assume that he will get that majority in 2015? On the Labour side, there are still doubts over Ed Miliband, especially on economic credibility, not to mention his weak response to the 2014 Budget. For all of Douglas Alexander’s tribalism (which is widely shared in the Labour Party), is shutting the door to the Lib Dems totally wise? UKIP will have to face these problems soon; it’s unlikely that they’ll gain any MPs in 2015, but if they gain a handful in a hung parliament do they really think that as potential kingmakers they’ll achieve 100% of their manifesto? They will face tough compromises should they enter a coalition, just as the Lib Dems did in 2010. However, as a party which currently has no MPs, surely it would be worth it to see some of their goals achieved, provided that the conditions are right?


Coalitions can have intrinsic and pragmatic value, and compromise can bring positive results. Political parties can make compromises and agreements whilst still shouting proudly about their individual identities. The post-war consensus between the Labour and Conservative parties took place during the so-called ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, but you’d be brave to suggest that the two parties were indistinguishable. A 2015 coalition shouldn’t be feared, but embraced. Moderating negative policies where possible, even if it means altering some of your own goals, is not a totally bad thing. To put it more bluntly, I don’t trust Labour or the Conservatives on their own in government. Do you?

2 comments:

  1. One Reason Ramsay Macdonald's standing may have suffered in 1931 was that he split his own party and led a splinter group to form a coalition with the Conservatives - in essence what Lloyd George had did in 1918. The only difference was the parliamentary arithmetic, which meant the official Labour Party still had a greater parliamentary strength, unlike Asquith's Liberals in 1918. Macdonald was basically a leader without a party, with just 13 MPs in 1931 and eight in 1935.

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  2. That's a good historical summation, Charlie! I think it reinforces the point that convincing party members of the merits of coalition has always been a tricky mission.

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