Where next for the centre-left?

Guest post - by Charles Britten

My thanks go to Ben once again for letting me loose on this blog. As ever, my attempt to offer a helicopter view of the political landscape is not necessarily from the centre-left, but this post will be specifically about the centre-left. 

The position of the centre-left in Britain - whether you describe it as liberal, social democratic or 'third way' - has gone from one of dominance to the wilderness with bewildering speed over the past few years. It is worth considering just what has happened. With the advent of New Labour and the electoral advances of the Liberal Democrats, the centre-left gained a stranglehold on British politics that lasted for nearly 20 years. From the mid-1990s it was clear Labour's shift from Clause IV socialism had chimed with the public, aided by a Conservative government riven with divisions over Europe and tired after many years in office. Even after new Labour's historic three terms in office ended in 2010, the Liberal Democrats were able to continue the centre-left involvement in government, albeit as a junior partner to the Conservatives.

In view of this, what has happened last year and this has been nothing short of a collapse. Ben and his Liberal Democrat colleagues could at least say they saw last year's election drubbing coming, as the inevitable disappointments of government alienated many supporters and also lost those who prefer to deliver a protest vote to someone who will actually get their hands dirty with the hard decisions of office. Even in view of all that, however, to be reduced to just eight MPs was worse than anyone had envisaged. For Labour, the situation has arguably been even more shocking. With Ed Miliband declaring New Labour to be dead but unable to offer a clear vision of what 'next Labour' was about, knowing a leftward-swing was electoral suicide but mindful of the discrediting of the Blair and Brown legacy, the party could not win an election it had once thought was there for the taking. Not only did it collapse in Scotland; it made little headway in England and lost ground to the Conservatives in Wales. The last factor went largely un-noticed by commentators distracted by events in Scotland, but it was significant nonetheless, with seats like Gower turning blue for the first time ever and former safe Labour strongholds like Bridgend becoming marginals. 

In Scotland, of course, all the unionist parties were left as helpless as King Canute before the tsunami of identity politics in the aftermath of the independence referendum, but the SNP was also able to make hay by embracing some specific causes associated with the left of the Labour Party, such as opposition to austerity and Trident. (Of course, in true SNP style they neglected to mention their preference for the George Osborne approach to corporation tax, having pledged in the 2014 white paper that they would set the rate in an independent Scotland permanently lower than in the remaining UK). The loss of its Scottish base was a big enough blow; one that places a question over Labour's ability to win a majority ever again as long as Scotland is part of the UK. But the election and recent re-election of Jeremy Corbyn has ripped open a gaping hole between the centre-left and the left. Most of the MPs are in the former camp, most of the members in the latter. Of course, it must be noted that whatever anyone's views on Corbyn, he has won fair and square and by big margins under the party's rules. That he was placed on the ballot by MPs who would never support him - in the hope of consoling the left with a voice in the debate before he dropped back into obscurity - demonstrated a miscalculation of how vulnerable the centre-left had become. 

The crisis is now extremely deep. The attempt to overturn last year's result came to nothing and Owen Smith's line was as left-wing was in any case Corbyn's on many issues. The Labour Party's future for the next few years is set in stone; Corbyn will lead them into the next election at the behest of a party that has rejected the centre-left position that gave it both its only election victories since flares were in fashion, and longest period in power ever. Instead, the membership seems dead-set on a course that is fiercely ideological, aggressively dismissive of all opposition and determined to act as a social protest movement against the modern world, whether or not this ambition gets them anywhere near the levers of government that would allow them to genuinely affect it. 

So how can the centre-left respond? The Labour leadership election gained all the media attention in a week when most people would barely have noticed the Liberal Democrat conference was going on anyway. Yet plenty of people in both parties can be forgiven for feeling bewildered at the collapse of centre-left influence in Britain, not least given the added blow of Brexit. Indeed, the latter factor reflects the fact that the third largest party in terms of popular support remains UKIP, even though they ought to have the biggest question mark over their future of any party, having now achieved the goal they were formed for and seemingly unable to elect a leader amid the Diane James' fiasco and punch-ups between the other candidates. The question is, where now? With hopes that the centre-left might avoid marginalisation in the Labour Party fading away - as evidenced by the iron fist under the velvet glove of Corbyn's declaration that "the vast majority" of MPs need not fear deselection - the question arises over whether the so-called Blairites will stay and fight, or split. If the latter, there are several historical precedents. 

The split of 1931 is the least relevant, as it involved a Labour prime minister leaving his own party behind and kicking it out of government as he formed a coalition with the Tories. More relevant is the 1981 case, where the SDP formed a party whose key points of difference with Labour were essentially the same issues - Europe, defence, the unions - that Blair subsequently won the argument over inside the Labour Party in the 1990s. However, anyone wishing to join such a body might as well join the Liberal Democrats, rather than repeating the messy exercise of arranging an alliance first and then merging two parties later. If they do not stay or join forces with the Liberal Democrats, a third possibility is that a tiny fringe of disaffected MPs might form an alternative Labour grouping and stand as such, like the Independent Democratic Labour Party label under which Dick Taverne won Lincoln in February 1974, only to lose the seat back to his old party in the second election of that year. His example, however, would also indicate that such an approach will not work in the long-term, and a lasting alternative must be found; Taverne eventually joined the SDP and is now a Liberal Democrat peer. 

The reality is there will probably be no move en masse by those on the right of Labour, with some staying, some jumping ship and others simply quitting in disgust. The problem for those who would consider a Liberal Democrat defection is it would mean doing so when their new party would be at its weakest in a generation. While it is, of course, numerically evident that if all or most of those Labour MPs who expressed no confidence in Corbyn jumped ship they could immediately make Tim Farron leader of the opposition, their emotional commitment to Labour and determination not to let Corbyn and Momentum reign unchallenged will act as a deterrent. This means that if any do defect, their numbers will likely be very small and of little lasting significance. Moreover, if there are significant deselections, these may make up a disproportionate number of those switching sides, as they will have so much less to lose. 

All this might sound like an unremittingly gloomy situation for the centre-left. Indeed, it may be for the next few years. The Conservatives will be the obvious beneficiaries of an unelectable opposition; after all, even if the economy or other issues provide deep problems as a result of Brexit, they could argue with at least qualified justification that they are dealing with a problem the electorate themselves chose to have. Moreover, there could be a real trap for anyone in the Labour or Liberal Democrat parties persisting in calling for another referendum before Brexit. To some, such a pledge will simply sound like a rejection of a democratic mandate and would be a gift to UKIP's propagandists. Moreover, as Owen Smith - an advocate of a second plebiscite - will now know, sometimes a second vote only strengthens your opponent's position. Tempting as the idea is to some, any attempt to block Brexit in parliament would be even more counterproductive; what bigger gift to those voicing UKIP's favoured narrative than to offer them prima facie evidence that 'the establishment' is seeking to overturn the will of the people? Such a move would not help neither the centre-left or the centre-right, but it would turn large areas of the electoral map purple come 2020. 

A wiser approach over Europe would be for the centre-left to take a more pragmatic attitude, as advocates of retaining single market membership, for example, while also being a little patient and willing to offer a future, post-Brexit referendum on rejoining the EU. This could be a clear and viable election manifesto pledge, one that will accept that the will of the majority was to leave, but is also willing to offer the people a chance to change that decision when they have seen what the reality of life after Brexit is like. Moreover, by then UKIP might have faded enough to lose their one MP and much of their vote. Some may regard that approach to Brexit as a surrender and too cautious, but it should be stressed that it is in the interests of the centre-left to take stock after the calamities of recent years. After all, this is not just a British phenomenon; social democratic parties all around Europe have been doing poorly of late. This is an issue that requires plenty of sensible planning and long-term thinking, not just reflex retreats to long-standing policy positions.

 Of course, being out of office means that exactly this kind of rethinking can be afforded, and time is certainly a plentiful commodity for those on the centre-left. For one thing, they are not the ones who will have to take the decisions in government over Brexit. Talk of an early election is risible, and, one suspects, often wishful thinking from Labour MPs hoping an early defeat would prompt Corbyn to quit. From Theresa May's point of view, such an election would force the Conservatives to nail their positions on various Brexit-related issues to the mast before the difficult internal debate has been settled (though for some Conservatives, it never will be), while the temptation to allow Corbyn longer to wreck Labour instead of inflicting a defeat that could finally unseat him must be irresistible. 

Moreover, there is another good reason to sit back, grab some popcorn and watch the unfolding Labour mayhem. Sooner or later Labour under Corbyn and McDonnell must show their own hand as to what they envisages a post-Brexit country and economy will look like. At the Labour conference this week, McDonnell talked about the "opportunities" Brexit offered. While Theresa May's conference speech hinted at a 'soft' Brexit involving some form of involvement with the single market, McDonnell used his own address to stress what he saw as the advantages of being outside it. That should alert sharp minds to the reality that few on the hard left have had anything more than a skin-deep commitment to the EU, and many have had anything but. 

This is not limited to Corbyn's lukewarm attitude, but the reality that the left of the Labour party has historically been deeply eurosceptic. True, this was only reflected in a handful of Labour MPs voting for Brexit this time, including a couple on the right of the party like Frank Field and Gisela Stuart, but Dennis Skinner was a clear representative of this tradition. Had they still been around, Tony Benn and Michael Foot - the chief Brexiteers in the Labour cabinet of 1975 referendum - would have cheered Corbyn's ascent and the vote on June 23rd with equal joy. Moreover, the level of visible euroscepticism in the Labour Party was diluted during the Blair years as many of the most anti-European left-wing MPs and former MPs left altogether and set up their own parties. Prominent examples of this include staunch Brexiteers like George Galloway and founder of the Trade Union and Socialist Coalition Dave Nellist. All this means that, soon enough, there will probably be a clear split between those on the left of the Labour Party happily embracing Brexit and those on the right still keen on a European future. It will make unifying the party even harder. 

However central the European question will be in the coming years, that will not be the only one for the centre-left to take stock on. As mentioned above, there may be a realignment of the centre-left, albeit a small affair, but one on which the dust will need to settle. Another issue is that of austerity, the post-crash narrative that has been watered down now Philip Hammond is in charge of the Treasury and Brexit offers a perfect excuse to rip up the old plans. Not only would austerity lite make the arguments over cuts less potent; in time the books will be sufficiently balanced to take it out of the equation. In simple terms, provided the economy doesn't tank after Brexit, there will come a time when the relevant discussion will no longer feature emotive talk about 'fighting cuts', but be about how to spend sensibly without running up another huge deficit. In other words, the foundations of the conversation will be more favourable to the political centre than now. 

However, the most important thing to recognise over all is that the wider political narrative has changed dramatically, because of the sense that a 'neoliberal' approach adopted across the political spectrum has failed many people. It is precisely this that has led to a range of radical reactions, from the rise of nationalism in Scotland to Labour's leftward lurch and, of course, the Brexit vote. It is important for those on the centre-left - in Britain and elsewhere - to work out just how to respond to a changing world and the widespread dissatisfaction so many feel with it. The emerging Conservative approach under Mrs May has been to talk tougher on immigration while promising to tackle "dysfunctional" markets like housing with more government intervention, abandoning the mantra of "you can't buck the market" that had held sway from Thatcher onwards. This sea change in thinking about the role of the state is perhaps more significant than many realise, for it is a recognition that the ideas that had been held true across the political centre have fallen out of favour. This, then, is the Conservative response, rooted in the beliefs of a leader whose inspiration is Joseph Chamberlain, not Friedrich Hayek. Perhaps it was appropriate that she delivered her speech in Birmingham.

 The centre-left now needs to reconsider its own philosophical approach and how this may be reflected in policy terms. In what ways can the centre-left advocate more interventionism itself while remaining distanced from the hard left? To ignore the question will mean no alternative being offered to the Corbynites. Meeting it head-on with practical ideas and answers for the circumstances Britain and the world now faces will be the start of the road back. A key issue in this is where Labour goes in the future. If it loses the next election as badly as expected, it may start a repeat of the long process that followed its 1983 debacle. If not, it will drift increasingly into the wilderness. UKIP may consider itself a potential opposition, with lofty dreams of hoovering up disaffected working-class votes from Labour in its former industrial heartlands, but its post-Brexit future will probably be that of an anti-immigration party with a visceral appeal most will find even more toxic than Nigel Farage's pre-referendum poster - and that's if it can survive at all. Given the in-fighting (sometimes literal), that must be in some doubt. If all that offers a boon for the Conservatives under Mrs May in the short term, the longer term will be different. Every government has it's sell-by date, the point after which it ceases to function well irrespective of the merits or flaws of its policy programme. Desire for a change will arise. That could take quite a few years, though maybe less if the party still cannot stop - in David Cameron's words - "banging on about Europe". 

Even if the Tories stay in power for some time, there will still need to be a credible opposition. Given the electoral alternatives of perpetual power for a centre right/right party, or supporting a declining, squabbling anti-immigration party whose historic mission has come and gone, or a hard-left party that is loved fanatically by a few and disdained by the many, the eventual re-emergence of an electorally credible centre-left party or parties must surely happen. The question is whether it will be a recovering Liberal Democrats, or a fresh incarnation of New Labour.

Photo credit: publicinterest.org.uk